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2Summary
To settle disputes concerning rights or obligations under WTO agreements, the WTO 
enforces a dispute settlement system. The WTO dispute settlement system has been in 
operation since 1995 and has, during this time, been the most productive of all 
international dispute settlement systems. The Dispute Settlement Understanding is a 
dispute settlement system between governments, and the use of the system is limited 
to members of the WTO. The WTO dispute settlement process contains four main 
stages, namely consultations, the panel stage, appellate review proceedings, and 
implementation and enforcement. I am focusing on the critical stage of 
implementation and enforcement and the practical problems that may arise using the 
remedies available in this phase of the process in this thesis.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding offers three types of remedies when a member 
is breaking WTO law. The withdrawal or amendment of the WTO-inconsistent 
measure is the final remedy. The DSU also provides for two temporary remedies 
which may be applied while awaiting the withdrawal or amendment or if the losing 
party fails to bring its inconsistent measure into compliance with WTO obligations. 
The two temporary remedies are compensation and suspension of concessions or 
other obligations. One issue arising at the implementation stage of the DSU is the 
relationship between article 21.5 of the DSU and article 22.2 of the DSU. Question 
may arise whether the compliance proceedings or the suspension of concessions 
proceedings has priority, if either. Past DSU review negotiations have not found a 
solution to this issue of sequencing yet, the discussion is continuing in the current 
negotiations.
The concept of compensation has not been used very frequently. There are several 
possible reasons why compensation as a remedy is rarely used in practice and I am 
focusing on three aspects in this thesis. First, compensation is voluntary, and the 
disputing parties have to agree on the solution. Second, the compensation must be 
consistent with the covered agreements. Third, the current system on compensation 
may not provide for effective reparation of damages suffered by the complaining 
party. There have been discussions from time to time to make the compensation 
within the DSU financial but every proposal has always been turned down.
To suspend concessions or other obligations is a remedy used more frequently than 
compensation. However, there are practical problems arising with this remedy as well. 
First, retaliation measures are trade destructive and can affect the injured party 
negatively as well as the losing party. Second, in particular the possibility to retaliate 
3is not a genuine option to smaller or developing country members. Third, these 
smaller and developing country members are also the ones that are most affected by 
the possibility to “cross-retaliate”. The discussion in this thesis shows that the remedy 
is not efficient for every party in every single dispute and may therefore uphold the 
inequality between the members of the WTO.
It was determined by the time of the introduction of the DSU that the system was to 
be examined and evaluated after using it for a couple of years. The negotiations are 
still in progress. The members were encouraged to contribute with questions, 
proposals, and comments concerning changes and improvements of the DSU to these 
special sessions. The Chairman of the Special Session of the DSU summarized the 
proposals and drafted legal texts which ended up in the so-called Chairman’s text. To 
me, it seems like the review of the DSU has been set aside while awaiting the 
negotiations in other important WTO areas. We may see the DSU as part of the 
overall “give and take” in the end anyway, even if this was not a desirable outcome in 
the beginning of the negotiations. 
3561 consultation questions have been made since the introduction of the dispute 
settlement system. It is important to remember that the great majority of the cases are 
settled through consultations or mutually agreed solutions, never reaching the full 
DSU process and the problems with the remedies described in this thesis.The 
remedies available today may not always result in the most efficient solution. 
However, it is important to remember that the remedies existing today are the 
remedies which the member states found they were willing to accept both as 
successful complainants and as unsuccessful defendants. From a democratic, 
diplomatic, and political point of view, an emergency exit like article 22 of the DSU 
is necessary for the practical function of the WTO dispute settlement system.    
  
1 Update of all WTO Dispute Settlement cases: Report WT/DS/OV/29, 9 January 2007. 
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91 Introduction
1.1 Introduction to Topic
The creation of fair and acceptable solutions to arising problems and disputes are the 
things I find most important and fascinating within the concept of jurisprudence. I 
believe that dispute settlement is one of the central elements when practicing law, 
both nationally and internationally. Dispute settlement within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is particularly interesting since the outcome influences different 
sized countries in different ways, in an area of great global importance. Taking 
economic, political, and social interests into account, these voluntary systems can be
hard to carry out in practice. 
The dispute settlement system has been a highlight of the WTO. It has evolved a lot
from its forerunner, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and it is 
known to be the most developed and most active system of formal dispute settlement 
of all international regimes.2 It is safe to predict that the WTO dispute settlement 
system, now in its second decade, will continue to be a highlight of the organization
which is why, with this thesis, I am drawing attention to this fact. 
1.2 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to study the current WTO dispute settlement system,
focusing on the critical stage of implementation and enforcement and the practical 
problems that may arise using the remedies available in this phase of the process. The 
main purpose is to pay attention to the actual effect in practice when using the 
remedies available and how the outcome affects different members of the 
organization in different ways. The purpose is also to examine the review and
negotiations on the area in order to glance into the future and development of the 
rulings.   
1.3 Method
The method in writing this thesis is to first create a background of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, its institutions, and its stages of procedures. It is of great 
importance to gain this knowledge in order to be able to see and understand the 
complexity of creating, using, and developing such a system. The background 
knowledge is mostly gathered from literature on the area, past and present WTO legal 
documents, and WTO official documentation and publications. The knowledge is
  
2 Lecture with Peter Kleen, School of Business, Economics and Law at Göteborg University, 14 March 
2007.
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applied to real life cases for a greater comprehension on how the rules are actually 
affecting the members. To gather information about cases and decisions, I have 
studied panel and Appellate Body reports in combination with articles, research 
papers, and different official WTO documents.
The method is to simultaneously glance into the future of the system while looking at 
the history. The discussion is inspired by articles, official WTO documentation and 
publications, and literature on the area. The current information on the WTO’s 
website is of course an important way to keep track of the development within the 
area. Of great importance for the overall work is the method of using personal 
contacts to gather knowledge, to apply the facts in reality, and to get feed back on my 
ideas and conclusions. Taking the course of Regulating International Trade3 during
the writing process created many personal contacts with professors and experts on the 
subject and with young argumentative co-students. The course provided me with 
important discussions and views on the subject, both in lectures and in smaller study 
groups. A real-life perspective was provided by telephone interviews with personnel 
at the Swedish national Board of Trade.    
1.4 Limitations
Within this thesis I will discuss the dispute settlement system within the WTO. I will 
primarily focus on the stage of implementation, on the remedies available within the 
system, and on the practical problems that may arise at this stage of the procedure. I
will also pay attention to the current negotiations on the subject and the future of the 
WTO dispute settlement system. When discussing the dispute settlement system in 
practice and the problems that may occur, I will only focus on three selective areas,
following my main thesis, namely the sequencing issue, the concept of compensation 
and retaliation as WTO remedies. The examination of the proposals in the current 
negotiations will not cover a number of contributions while focusing on the affore-
mentioned issues. Though the discussion concerning the future of The Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) will have a 
more general approach.  
1.5 Disposition
This thesis contains ten chapters. Chapter two to six provide the reader with
background knowledge concerning the WTO dispute settlement system, the 
institutions involved within the system, the jurisdiction of the system, the access to 
the system, and the process. Chapter seven further explains the stage of 
  
3 Regulating International Trade, Supervisor: Per Cramér, The Department of Law, School of 
Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Sweden, 23 January to 28 March 2007.  
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implementation and enforcement and the remedies available before moving on to 
chapter number eight, which is applying article 21 of the DSU and article 22 of the 
DSU in practical situations. The three last chapters of the thesis are examining the 
DSU review and negotiations and discussing the future of the DSU before 
summarizing up with some concluding comments.  
2 WTO Dispute Settlement System
2.1 Introduction
The agreements between the members of the WTO provide many extensive rules 
concerning international trade in goods, trade in services and aspects related to trade 
of intellectual property. Economically, politically, and otherwise, these rules are very 
important for the members of the organization. Hereby, it is no surprise that the 
members do not always agree on what is the correct application and interpretation of 
the rules. Members often argue whether about if a particular law or practice of a 
member constitutes a violation of an obligation or right provided in a specific WTO 
agreement. 
To settle disputes concerning rights or obligations under WTO agreements between 
members, the WTO enforces a dispute settlement system. Dispute settlement is a 
central pillar in the multilateral trading system, and it aims to bring stability to the 
global economy. With the means of settling disputes and the possibility of enforcing
WTO law, the WTO rules-based system is striving to become more efficient, 
predicable, and secure. The priority is not, however, to pass judgement, but instead, 
where possible, to settle disputes through consultations and negotiations.4    
The WTO dispute settlement system has been in operation since 1995 and has, during 
this time, been the most productive of all international dispute settlement systems. 
During its first ten years, more disputes had been brought to the WTO for settlement 
than to its predecessor, GATT, during its forty-seven years of existence from 1948 to 
1995.5
2.2 Historic Development of the System
Even though the WTO dispute settlement system has only been used since the first of 
January 1995, it is not a novel system. The system is based on almost fifty years of 
experience in trade dispute resolution from the GATT 1947. Disputes of today as well 
  
4 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm , visited on 30 January 2007
5 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and Materials, 
p 173.
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as disputes of past times can be solved in many different ways. Essentially there are 
two methods6 to reach a peaceful resolution of international disputes:
(i) through diplomatic negotiations between the concerned parties, with varying 
interference and assistance by third parties; or  
(ii) through adjudication by an independent entity, also called arbitration and 
judicial settlement.
There has been an increase in the importance and efficiency of international dispute 
settlement through adjudication over the last years. The WTO dispute settlement 
system is one of the main contributors of this evolution in international relations. 
2.2.1 The System under GATT 1947
GATT 1947 did not provide a detailed dispute settlement system; it contained only 
two articles relating to dispute settlement. Neither article XXII of the GATT nor 
article XXIII of the GATT specifically mentioned dispute settlement or a detailed way 
to handle an upcoming disagreement between the members. The unsuccessful 
settlement of a dispute under articles XXII or XXIII was during the first years of 
GATT and handled by “working parties”. The working parties were composed by,
and consisted of representatives of all interested contracting parties including the 
parties of the dispute. The working parties adopted the reports by consensus among all 
participants.7
The system of working parties was replaced by panels consisting of three to five 
independent experts from non-involved GATT contracting parties. The panels 
reported their conclusions to the GATT Council which consisted of all the members. 
The Council had to adopt the recommendations or rulings by consensus before it 
became legally binding upon the members concerned. The GATT panels created an 
important jurisprudence and started to follow a more rules-based and judicial style of 
reasoning in their reports. This system worked well during the 1950s whilst the 
organization was still relatively small and consisted of like-minded members which
had worked together in the ITO/GATT negotiations and agreed upon the GATT 
1947.8
  
6 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and Materials, 
pp 175-176. 
7 GATT 1947 article XXIII:2, A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, p 12. 
8 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and Materials, 
p 177.
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The dispute settlement system was not used frequently during the 1960s, but when the 
European Economic Community was established and an increasing number of 
developing countries became members of the WTO, the need for a dispute settlement 
system became essential. One problem that resulted was that the small, homogenous 
group of members was replaced by a new, larger organization consisting of a more 
argumentative generation. As a solution, a legal office was established in 1983 to help 
the trade diplomats with the panel reports. This created more confidence among the 
members, and the panel reports were used as a kind of precedent. The GATT dispute 
settlement system gradually changed from a power-based system of settlement 
through diplomatic negotiations into a system with features of a rule-based system of 
dispute settlement through adjudication.9   
Even though the GATT system generally was considered effective, it had some 
serious imperfections which became obvious during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The most acute problem was the way key decisions10 were taken. These decisions 
were all to be taken by consensus of the Council. A member concerned by the conflict 
could block or delay a decision and paralyse the whole dispute settlement system. 
Panels were pressured to come to a conclusion satisfactory to all parties even if it may
not have been the most convincing one. It was hard for the panels to handle disputes 
regarding sensitive political matters due to the assumption that the losing member 
would block the adoption of the report.
Another problem during this time was related to some of the agreements concluded in
the Tokyo Round in 1973-1979. For example The Anti-Dumping Code, contained
special dispute settlement procedures for disputes concerning these agreements. 
Confusion and disputes arose over which procedure applied to which dispute. A risk 
for “forum-shopping” appeared where a member might choose the agreement and the 
dispute settlement system most beneficial for their specific dispute.11   
2.2.2 The Uruguay Round 
The dispute settlement system had high priority during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. In 1989, halfway through the negotiations, the members agreed to 
implement some preliminary rules of dispute settlement. The decision was called 
  
9 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, pp 12-14, 
Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and Materials, 
pp 177-179.
10 Examples on key decisions are: decisions on the establishment and composition of a panel, the
decisions on adoption of a panel report, and the decisions on the authorisation on the suspension of 
concession. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, p 180.
11 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, pp 14-15. 
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Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures and contained,
for example, the recognition of the right of a complainant to bring a case before a 
panel and detailed timeframes for panel proceedings. However, no agreement was 
reached concerning the issue on how to adopt panel reports.12
The atmosphere among the members changed drastically when the US Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 was presented. The act intensified and extended section 
301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. Section 301 stimulated the imposition of unilateral 
trade sanctions against countries which the United States considered to be in violation 
of their obligations under GATT. The other members objected and demanded the 
United States change its legislation. The United States pointed out that, due to the 
concept of consensus decision, the GATT dispute settlement system was too weak to 
protect the interests of US trade. This situation encouraged the other member 
governments to propose a deal and they agreed to create a new and more secure 
system in exchange for Section 301 not being implemented by the United States.13
2.2.3 The Dispute Settlement Understanding
As a result of the deal concerning section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, an 
agreement was reached on the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes. This was one of the most important accomplishments of 
the Uruguay Round Negotiations. This agreement is usually referred to as the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding or the DSU. The DSU is part of the WTO Agreement as 
Annex 2. An important new feature in the DSU was the elimination of any member’s 
right to block the adoption of a report. In this new system, the panels and reports are 
automatically established and adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), unless 
there is a consensus not to do so.14  
3 The Institutions Involved in the System
The WTO dispute settlement procedure involves a number of different participants.
While discussing the institutions involved in the WTO dispute settlement system one 
usually distinguishes between political institutions and independent judicial-type 
institutions. DSB is an example of the former and the Appellate Body is an example 
of the latter. This chapter will introduce some of the most appearing bodies 
participating in the process.15
  
12 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, p 15. 
13 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 180-181.
14 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, pp 15-16.
15 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, p 17.
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3.1 The Dispute Settlement Body
The WTO dispute settlement system is administered by the dispute settlement body
(DSB).16 The WTO Agreement states that there shall be a General Council composed 
of representatives, usually ambassador-level diplomats, of all the members.17 The 
representatives reside at the WTO base in Geneva and they act under the trade
ministry or the foreign affairs ministry of the member they represent. The DSB is a 
political institution since the participants receive instructions from their government
on the positions to take within the DSB.18 Further, the WTO Agreement establishes 
that the General Council and the DSB are in fact the same body; the DSB is the alter 
ego of the General Council. Basically, the General Council acts like the DSB when it 
is administering (i.e. overseeing) the dispute settlement system.19
The DSB has the authority to establish panels (the referral of a dispute to 
adjudication), to adopt panel and Appellate Body reports (making the adjudicative 
decision binding), to maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and 
recommendations, and to authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations 
under the covered agreements.20 The DSB also appoints the members of the Appellate 
Body.21  
The DSB shall take a decision under the DSU by consensus. The DSB shall be 
considered to have decided by consensus if no member present at the meeting of the 
DSB when the decision is taken formally objects to the proposed decision22. 
Practically this means that the chairperson does not actively ask every member 
present whether it supports the decision or not, nor is there a vote. A member that 
wants to block a proposal must be alert and active during the meeting. 
It is also important to observe the negative/reverse consensus that applies when the 
DSB establishes panels, adopts panel and Appellate Body reports, and when it 
authorizes retaliation.23 Practically this means that the DSB must approve the decision 
unless there is a consensus against it. Hereby, a member can always prevent this 
reverse consensus by avoiding blocking the decision. In other words, a member that 
wants to block a decision needs to persuade all the other WTO members to block or 
  
16 Article 2.1 of the DSU
17 Article IV:2 of the WTO Agreement
18 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, p 17.
19 Article IV:3 of the WTO Agreement
20 Article 2.1 of the DSU
21 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, p 229. 
22 Article 2.1 of the DSU
23 Articles 6.1, 16.4, 17.14 and 22.6 of the DSU
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stay passive. This system turns the negative consensus into a theoretical possibility of 
quasi-automatic nature. It also makes the DSB’s real influence over WTO dispute 
settlement limited. But the system fills the important purpose of keeping the members 
informed of the disputes and it also creates a political forum for debate concerning the 
use of the system.    
3.2 Panels and The WTO Secretariat
The quasi-judicial panels are in charge of the actual adjudication at the first instance 
of the dispute settlement system. The panels normally consist of three, in exceptional 
cases five, experts. These experts are chosen for the purpose of adjudicating a certain 
case. The panels are not permanent; a new panel is established for every dispute and is 
dissolved when the duty is completed.24 The complaining party must request the DSB 
to establish a panel. The panel shall be established by reverse consensus at the latest at 
the DSB meeting following the meeting at which the request for the establishment 
first appeared.25
A panel shall be composed of well-qualified and independent individuals, both 
governmental and/or non-governmental. Examples of suitable panel members are 
according to the DSU individuals who have presented or served a case to a panel, 
served as a representative of a member, or served as a representative to the council.
The appointed individuals serve independently and not as representatives of the 
government or any organization. Nationals of the members concerned by the dispute 
are not suitable unless the parties agree otherwise.26 Normally, panellists are retired 
government trade officials with legal and academic knowledge. The WTO Secretariat 
maintains a list of individuals suitable for the task.27   
The panel established must review the legal and factual aspects of the case and yield a 
report on its conclusions to the DSB. A panel may examine and consider only those 
claims that it has the authority to regard under its terms of reference.28 The panel must 
make an objective assessment of the facts and if the panel finds the claims from the 
complainant legitimate and the measures or actions being challenged WTO-
inconsistent, it makes a recommendation for implementation by the respondent.29
  
24 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, p 231. 
25 See article 6 of the DSU for more specific rules. See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, 
paragraph 142. 
26 Article 8 of the DSU
27 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 235-236. Article 8.4 of the DSU 
28 Article 7 of the DSU
29 Articles 11 and 19 of the DSU
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The WTO Secretariat is in charge of the administrative element of the dispute 
settlement system. The institution is also assisting the panels on the procedural and 
legal level in the current dispute meaning that the Secretariat takes care of the 
logistical and organizational preparations as well as assisting the panels with legal 
support, for example outlining the jurisprudence of past panel decisions.30 Since the 
panels are just temporary institutions, the permanent WTO Secretariat provides the 
system with continuity, consistency, and predictability.31  
3.3 Appellate Body
A permanent Appellate Body hears appeals concerning reports of dispute settlement 
panels.32 Hereby, the Appellate Body is the second and final stage of the adjudicative 
stage of the system. The body was established by the DSB in 1995 and consists of 
seven members. The members are elected for a four year term, and every individual 
may be re-elected once. The persons shall serve in rotation. A member of the 
Appellate Body must be a person of recognized authority with demonstrated expertise 
in law, international trade, and the subject matter of the covered agreement. The 
person must not be affiliated with any government. All the members need to be 
available at any time, and shall not participate in any dispute that may create a direct 
or indirect conflict of interest.33 So far, most of the members have been senior judges, 
university professors, practising lawyers, or past government officials.34
The Appellate Body may uphold (agrees with both the reasoning and the conclusion 
of the panel), modify (agrees with the conclusion but not with the reasoning), or 
reverse (disagrees with the conclusion) the legal findings of the panel.35 In some cases 
the Appellate Body has gone beyond its mandate and completed the legal analysis, for 
example addressing the claims that the panel did not address.36  
4 Jurisdiction of the System
The WTO dispute settlement system has jurisdiction over consultation and dispute 
settlement under the covered agreements occurring between members. The cause of 
action for a WTO dispute needs to be found in the covered agreements listed in 
  
30 Article 27 of the DSU
31 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, p 23.
32 Article 17.1 of the DSU
33 Article 17 of the DSU
34 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, pp 23-24.
35 Article 17.13 of the DSU
36 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 252-254. 
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Appendix 1 to the DSU.37 The covered agreements consist of the WTO Agreement, 
the DSU, the TRIPS Agreement, the GATS, the GATT 1994, and all other 
multilateral agreements on trade in goods. Hereby, the DSU creates a sole, coherent 
dispute settlement system that may be used on any dispute arising under the covered 
agreements. On the other hand, some of the agreements do provide for special and 
more detailed rules relating to specific obligations under that agreement. In this case, 
the additional rules apply over the rules in the DSU to the extent there is a difference 
between them.38
The WTO dispute settlement system distinguishes itself by a broad scope of 
jurisdiction as well as by an obligatory, exclusive and contentious nature. 
Complaining members are obligated to recourse to, and abide by the rules and 
understanding of the DSU.39 Becoming a member of the WTO involves an acceptance 
of the obligatory jurisdiction of the dispute settlement system. In case of a dispute, 
members have to recourse to the DSU to the exclusion of any other system.40  
5 Access to the System
The DSU is a dispute settlement system between governments, and the use of the 
system is limited to members of the WTO.41 Each covered agreement clarifies the 
provisions under which a member can turn to the DSU for settlement of a dispute.
Particular attention shall be paid to Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994. The article 
states the bases for the complaint, and many of the other covered agreements are 
referring to this article. The WTO system offers three types of complaint, which is 
rare in comparison to other international dispute settlement systems. The different 
complaints are violation complaints, non-violation complaints, and situation 
complaints.42
The Dispute Settlement System does not require a member to have a legal interest to 
have access to the system. The Appellate Body stated in the EC – Bananas III case 
that a member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another 
member under the DSU or not. The Appellate Body found that the United States had 
the right to bring a claim under the GATT 1994 even though the member did not 
export bananas. The Appellate Body saw the United States as a potential exporter of 
  
37 Article 1.1 of the DSU
38 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, p 188, article 1.2 of the DSU
39 Article 23.1 of the DSU
40 Panel Report, US – Section 301 Trade Act, paragraph 7.43.
41 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paragraph 101. 
42 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 191-192.
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bananas because of its current production, and the EC banana management might 
affect the US’ market. The Appellate Body added that the conclusion did not mean 
that the factors the body had noted in this case would necessarily be conclusive in 
another case.43
However, the Appellate Body stated the strong power of initiative of the members in
the Mexico – Corn Syrup case. Given the largely self-regulating nature of the 
requirement in Article 3.7 of the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body must presume 
that when a member submits a request for an establishment of a panel, such member 
does so in good faith and, has duly exercised its judgement as to whether recourse to 
that panel would be fruitful.44     
Even if almost every dispute brought to the WTO directly concerns exporting or 
importing individuals and companies or non-governmental organizations these parties 
do not have direct access to the dispute settlement system.45 Only WTO members can 
bring disputes under the system. There is not a harmonized view on whether non-
governmental actors shall play a role in the proceedings under the DSU or not. Many 
WTO members have adopted internal regulations giving the private actors a 
possibility to bring a violation of WTO law to the attention of their government.46
Appellate Body case law gives the panels and the Appellate Body the authority to 
consider written briefs from private actors. The Appellate Body and the panels have 
the good judgment to accept or reject these amicus curiae briefs (friend of the court 
briefs) but are not forced to consider them at all. Many members criticise the concept 
of the amicus curiae and to date there is no clear rule adopted.47   
6 The Process
The WTO dispute settlement process contains four main stages.48 This section briefly 
analyzes the first three stages before moving on to a more comprehensive examination 
of the fourth stage in chapter number seven. 
  
43 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, paragraphs 132-138.
44 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Corn Syrup, paragraph 74.
45 For example: Kodak actively supported the US claims in Japan – Film, Chiquita played a central role 
in the involvement of the United States in the EC – Bananas. 
46 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 202-203.
47 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, p 9.
48 See annexes 1 and 2 of this paper: Time frames and Flowchart of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
process. 
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6.1 Consultations
The DSU prefer and recommend disputing members to reach a solution through 
consultations at the first stage.49 An amicable solution is more cost-effective and 
creates a better long-term trade relationship between the members than adjudication 
by a panel. Consultations also give the parties a chance to discuss the facts and the 
claims, and possibly avoid misunderstandings. A foundation for settlement or further 
DSU proceedings is created. 
Any WTO member having the opinion that a benefit under the WTO agreement is 
being nullified or impaired by another member has the right to ask for consultations. 
The WTO members are required to pay sympathetic consideration to and offer
adequate opportunity for consultations. The request for consultation shall be notified 
to the DSB, and it must be submitted in writing giving the reasons for the request and 
identifying the measure at issue and the legal basis for the complaint.50
The consultations are mainly a diplomatic process with no prejudice to the rights of 
any member in any further proceedings. Offers made during this stage have no legal 
consequences to the later stages of the DSU proceedings. A member must reply to a 
request within ten days if not otherwise agreed. The member shall enter into 
consultations within thirty days after the date of receipt of the request in good faith,
and with the view to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. If these time limits are not 
followed, the requesting member has the right to proceed directly to the establishment 
of a panel.51
Consultations can be requested under either article XXII of the GATT or article XXIII 
of the GATT. The main difference between the two legal bases is the ability for third 
parties to join the consultation. Consultations that are held pursuant to Article XXII of 
the GATT are open for other WTO members. Hereby, the choice between the two 
bases is a strategic one depending on if the complainant wants other parties to 
participate or not. Third parties may have a substantial trade interest in the dispute and 
may therefore want to request to join consultations.52  
Successful consultations leading to a mutually agreed dispute solution must be 
notified to the DSB and other relevant bodies. Any member may rise a point relating 
  
49 Article 4 of the DSU
50 Article 4.2 and 4.4 of the DSU
51 Articles 4.6 and 4.3 of the DSU, Panel Report, US – Underwear, paragraph 7.27.
52 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, pp 45-47.
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to the solution. Every agreed solution must be consistent with WTO law.53 If the 
consultations between the parties fail within sixty days of the receipt of the request for 
consultation, the complainant may request the establishment of a panel for 
adjudication. Special rules apply when a developing-country is involved in the 
consultations. The consultations between the parties usually continue during the panel 
process.54
6.2 The Panel Stage
The request for establishment of a panel starts the adjudicative stage of the process. If 
the parties are unable to agree on the composition of the panel, the composition will 
be decided by the WTO Director-General. The DSU sets out the basic rules 
concerning panel proceedings. Many panels find it necessary to complement the 
regulation with more detailed working procedures.55  
Both parties of the dispute submit written presentations to the panel. After each 
written submission, the panel holds a meeting with the parties where the members can 
speak their minds and present their points of view. In recent years, the meetings have 
become more formal and court-like. The panel has the authority to ask any WTO 
member about information in the case. Even at this stage, the developing countries 
have access to special treatment.56 Any WTO member having a substantial interest in 
a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB, shall have an 
opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions.57 The panel 
also has the right to seek information and technical advice about complex issues in the 
case from any individual, body, or expert which it deems appropriate.58
Panel deliberations are confidential, and the reports are drafted in the light of the 
information provided during the proceedings without the presence of the parties59. 
The panel issues an interim report containing a descriptive section, its findings and its
conclusions. The parties may request the panel to review aspects in the report or to 
hold another meeting. The arguments of the review are included in the final report.60  
  
53 Articles 3.6 and 3.5 of the DSU
54 Articles 4.7, 12.10 and 11 of the DSU 
55 Article 12 of the DSU and Appendix 3 to the DSU
56 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 261-263.
57 Article 10.2 of the DSU
58 Article 13 of the DSU
59 Articles 14.1 and 14.2 of the DSU
60 Article 15 of the DSU
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A couple of weeks after the final report has been presented to the members concerned
and translated into the three working languages of the WTO, the report is distributed 
to the rest of the WTO. Within sixty days after the date of the circulation, the report is 
adopted at a DSB meeting, unless one of the parties decides to appeal or the DSB 
decides by consensus not to adopt the report. As a general rule, the panel must 
conduct its examination within six months. However, practically a panel process lasts 
for over twelve months. The delay is, for example, explained by the complexity of the 
case, the need to consult experts, and problems scheduling meetings.61  
6.3 Appellate Review Proceedings
Only the disputing parties are allowed to appeal a panel report. Third parties which 
have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the dispute at the time of the 
establishment of the panel can make written submissions and be heard by the 
Appellate Body.62 The majority of the reports circulated are appealed to the Appellate 
Body. 
Article 17 of the DSU is the only article specifically dealing with the structure, 
procedures and functions of the Appellate Body. However, several general articles 
can be applied on the work of this instance. The Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review63 set out detailed working procedures for the Appellate Body. These Working 
Procedures handle everything from the duties of the Appellate Body to the specific 
deadlines for filing an appeal. Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures allows, under 
certain circumstances, the Appellate Body to adopt additional procedures. An 
appellate review is initiated when a party announces the DSB in writing of its decision 
to appeal, and simultaneously filing a notice of appeal with the Appellate Body.64  
The Working Procedures provide for detailed rules concerning deadlines, written 
submissions, and oral hearings. In appellate review proceedings, all third parties have
a right to file a notice of appeal and to participate in oral hearings. The DSU states
that the appellate review shall not exceed sixty days counting from the day a party 
formally notifies its decision to appeal. The Appellate Body shall notify the DSB in 
written when a delay is in question. In no case shall the proceedings take more than 
ninety days. In practice, the procedure in most of the cases has taken more than sixty
days but the majority of all cases are completed within the ninety day period. Reasons 
  
61 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 269-270.
62 Article 17.4 and 17.6 of the DSU
63 Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/7, Dated 1 May 2003.
64 Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization – Text, Cases and 
Materials, pp 270-273.
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for the delays have so far been the complexity of the case, delayed translations, and 
work overloads.65  
The appeals are limited to legal questions and may only concern issues of law covered 
in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.66 Therefore, the 
distinction between factual and legal questions is very important at this stage. 
Requesting an examination of new factual evidence or re-examining already existing 
evidence is not allowed. Evaluating evidence and establishing facts is the job of the 
panels. Generally speaking, a fact is the occurrence of a certain event in time and 
space67, for example, whether or not a national authority has charged a thirty percent 
tariff instead of a twenty percent tariff on the importation of a certain shipment of 
goods. In comparison, the interpretation of the expression “like products” in article 
III:2 of the GATT is a question of law. Mixed questions of law and facts will of
course arise in disputes. The Appellate Body jurisprudence gives guidance how to 
handle these problems in practice.68
7 Implementation and Enforcement
This chapter will provide the reader with a greater knowledge concerning the last 
stage of the dispute settlement proceedings.
7.1 Background
The stage of implementation and enforcement is a question discussed among the 
members since the creation of the organization. Article XXIII of the GATT contains 
one sentence that states: “If the contracting parties consider that the circumstances 
are serious enough to justify such actions, they may authorize a contracting party or 
parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such 
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be 
appropriate in the circumstances.” The proposal from the Geneva Conference in 
1947 contained a similar solution. The discussions during the following conferences 
and rounds mainly concerned details about the remedies and the hierarchy between 
the different remedies as final or temporary measures.69
The negotiations ended up with a solution where the DSU offers three types of 
remedies when a member is breaking WTO law. The withdrawal or amendment of the 
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66 Article 17.6 of the DSU
67 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paragraph 132.
68 A WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, pp 66-67.
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WTO-inconsistent measure is the final remedy. The DSU also provides for two 
temporary remedies which may be applied while awaiting the withdrawal or 
amendment or if the losing party fails to bring its inconsistent measure into 
compliance with WTO obligations. The two temporary remedies are compensation 
and suspension of concessions or other obligations, also referred to as retaliation. This 
section will further examine the implementation stage and the different remedies 
available in past and present time. 
7.2 Article 21 of the DSU
When the DSB adopts the panels and, when in question, the Appellate Body’s reports,
there is a recommendation or ruling by the DSB addressed to the losing party to bring 
itself into conformity with WTO law or to find a mutually satisfactory modification. 
Article 3.7 of the DSU states that in the absence of a mutually agreement solving the 
dispute, the first stage in the dispute settlement system is usually to secure the 
withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measure. 
7.2.1 Development of the Rule
One problem concerning trade related dispute settlement is how to guarantee that the 
losing party will comply with the ruling of the judging body. A necessary condition 
for upholding a functional system is a losing party obeying without coercive measures 
being applied. Surveillance and countermeasures from other parties put pressure on 
the losing party to comply with the rulings which may lead to implementation.
GATT article XXIII does not mention anything either about a member complying 
with a ruling within a certain time, or about any surveillance of the implementation.
The article only mentions the possibility for GATT contracting parties to make 
proposals to the disputing parties or decide in the question. GATT contracting parties 
can also authorize a member to retaliate. The understanding from 197970 was a bit
more concrete in its recommendation even if it was still quite vague. It stated: The 
Contracting Parties shall keep under surveillance any matter on which they have 
made recommendations or given rulings. If the contracting parties’ recommendations 
are not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the contracting party 
bringing the case may ask the contracting parties to make suitable efforts with a view 
to finding an appropriate solution. 
  
70 Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance of 28 November 
1979 (BISD 26S/210) p 22. 
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The Ministerial Declaration in 198271 further specified the rules. The Council should 
survey the implementation process while the losing member reported continuously to 
the council about its proceedings. The GATT contracting parties should make suitable 
efforts to find an appropriate solution, and this could include a recommendation to 
compensate or an authorization to retaliate. The stage of implementation was attended 
to even in the Uruguay round. The main discussion concerned time frames and how to 
solve a dispute concerning the current status and level of the implementation of the 
losing party. The discussions continued and resulted in more concrete rules in the 
Decisions on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and procedures72.
These rules became the foundation of the more detailed and concrete rules in the 
current Dispute Settlement Understanding.73      
7.2.2 Surveillance and Implementation in the DSU today
Article 21 of the DSU regulates the surveillance and implementation of 
recommendations and rulings. The article states that prompt compliance with
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure the effective 
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all members.74 The first obligation of the losing 
party is to inform the DSB within thirty days after the adoption of the report of its 
intention to implement the recommendations or rulings of the DSB. If immediate 
compliance is not possible, the implementing member has a reasonable period of time 
to put the recommendation or ruling into practice. The reasonable period of time may: 
(i) Be determined by the DSB; 
(ii) Be agreed on by the parties to the dispute; or 
(iii) Be determined through binding arbitration at the request of either party.75
Practically, WTO members often claim that prompt compliance is impracticable. In 
many cases this is also true since an implementation often requires an amendment or a 
change in domestic law and legislative changes usually take time. During the 
reasonable period of time, the member continues to break WTO law but the member 
will not face the consequences of non-implementation. A guideline for the arbitrator 
in determining the reasonable period of time is that it should not exceed 15 months 
from the date of adopting the report. The time should be the shortest period possible 
  
71 Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, Decision on Dispute Settlement (BISD 29S/13), p 
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72 Decision on Improvements on the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures of 12 April 1989 
(BISD 36S/61) p 1.
73 Seth, Tvistlösning i WTO: Om rättens betydelse i den internationella handelspolitiken, pp 388-393.
74 Article 21.1 of the DSU
75 Article 21.3 of the DSU
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within the legal system of the member concerned. Particular attention should be paid 
to matters affecting the interests of developing country members.76  
The DSB is responsible for the supervision of the implementation of panel and 
Appellate Body reports. Any member can raise the question of implementation at any 
time in the DSB. If the DSB does not decide otherwise, the issue of implementation is 
placed on the agenda of the DSB six months following the date of which the duration 
of the reasonable period of time is determined. The question remains on the agenda 
until the issue is solved. The EC – Bananas III case, for example, has been on the 
DSB agenda for years. No later than ten days before every DSB meeting, the member 
concerned is obliged to hand in a written report to the DSB explaining its 
implementation status. The reports put pressure on the member to advance in
implementation, and they promote transparency. The complainant and any other 
members, usually take the opportunity to demand full implementation when the 
reports are handed in. The action shows that they are continuing to follow the matter 
closely and with full attention.77
7.2.2.1 Compliance Panel Procedure
When a disagreement arises whether the losing member has implemented the 
recommendation or ruling or not, either of the disputing parties can request an 
establishment of a panel78. This can easily happen in practice and has been a recurrent 
issue in the EC – Bananas III case79, when the losing party has decided to pass a new 
law or regulation believing that this accomplishes full compliance, but the compliant 
disagrees. This procedure is referred to as the compliance panel procedure. The DSB 
refers the matter, if possible, to the original panel which shall circulate its report 
within ninety days. The Appellate body made clear that the task of the panel is not 
only to decide if the implementation effort fully complies with the recommendation or 
ruling. The panel must also judge the new measure in its whole and its consistency 
with a covered agreement.80 Therefore, the assessment can include new and different 
claims from the ones raised before the original panel and Appellate Body.           
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7.3 Article 22 of the DSU 
If the losing member fails to implement the recommendation or ruling by the end of 
the reasonable period of time, the complaining party can turn to temporary remedies. 
These can be either compensation or suspension of WTO obligations. The temporary 
remedies are not preferred to full implementation of the decision of the DSB. 
Compensation and suspension of concessions shall only be applied until full 
implementation is performed.81  
7.3.1 Compensation
Compensation is usually a way to make up for something that has happened, for
example a caused damage or a performed work. The concept of compensation is used 
in different ways both within international law and in national jurisdiction. This 
section will present the solution within the WTO.   
7.3.1.1 Development of the Rule
As said earlier, article XXIII of the GATT does not contain any rulings about 
compensation. The Nordic members made a jointly proposal on the aspect in the 
negotiations in 1954 – 1955. The working party discussed the question and concluded 
that compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the 
measure was impracticable and only as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal 
of the measures which were inconsistent with the agreement. The report was later 
accepted by the GATT contracting parties. 
The special needs of the developing countries were not discussed until ten years later. 
Brazil and Uruguay made a proposal which gave developing countries a right to 
financial compensation under certain circumstances. The proposal was widely 
criticized and was never adopted. The understanding from 1979 adopted the report 
from 1954 – 1955, and the ministerial declaration from 1982 stated that the GATT 
contracting parties could recommend compensatory adjustment with respect to other 
products.82  
The discussions in the Uruguay round concentrated on the creation of a well 
functioning system. On the one hand, the negotiators had the basic thought of 
reparation when causing damage. On the other hand they thought of the difficulties 
when deciding how the damage should be calculated and who should get the power to 
decide in which form compensation should be granted. Many members made 
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82 Seth, Tvistlösning i WTO: Om rättens betydelse i den internationella handelspolitiken, pp 418-421.
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proposals, and one joint opinion was that compensation was preferred to retaliation in 
all disputes. It was also stated that it would be difficult for a winning party to accept 
compensation in an area other than the damaged one.
The Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and 
Procedures83 did not mention anything about the concept of compensation, meaning
the short statement from 1979 was still applicable. The discussion continued, and the 
members finally agreed on compensation as a temporary remedy but not a legal 
obligation. Many members were concerned that compensation may encourage non-
compliance with recommendations and rulings. It was also observed that 
compensation did not benefit the specific industry that was actually damaged. The 
observation was recognized that the possibility to use compensation as a remedy was 
especially important to developing countries since these members usually have 
limited capacity to retaliate against a stronger opponent. The discussions finally 
resulted in the current rules in the Dispute Settlement Understanding.   
7.3.1.2 Compensation in the DSU Today
If the losing party does not manage to reach full compliance by the end of the 
reasonable period of time, it has to enter into negotiations with the winning party with 
a view to agree upon a mutually acceptable compensation.84 Compensation according 
to article 22 of the DSU is temporary and voluntary, meaning both parties need to 
agree upon using the concept of compensation and the level of the compensation. The 
compensation must be consistent with the covered agreements.
It is generally understood that compensation is to be offered not only to the winning 
party but to all WTO members. Compensation does not generally mean an amount of 
money being paid; it rather involves a benefit offered by the respondent. For example, 
the benefit can contain the lifting of trade barriers by the losing member which is 
equivalent to the benefit which the respondent has nullified or impaired by applying 
its measure.85 Through this construction, compensation supports free trade principles.
7.3.1.3 Compensation in Other WTO Rules
There are some other rules existing within WTO that mention compensation to other 
members when a member wants to change its trade policy. One rule can be found in
article XXVIII of the GATT. The WTO agreements include a special interpretation of 
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85 Seth, WTO och den internationella handelsordningen, p 100. 
29
this article86. The article states that if a member wants to modify or withdraw a 
concession, it is obligated to negotiate with the other members. The negotiations may 
include provision for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products, but the 
members concerned shall endeavor to maintain a general level of reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous concessions as favourable to trade as what was provided for in
the agreement before the negotiations. Parties of the negotiations shall be the 
contracting parties with a principal supplying interest. 
Another rule concerning compensation can be found in article XXIV of the GATT. If 
a number of members want to create a new customs territory, and the customs level 
becomes higher than before the new agreement was established, which is a prohibited
measure under GATT, the group of members must negotiate with concerned members 
about compensation. Guidelines can be found in the special interpretation mentioned 
earlier. The Agreement on Safeguards also provides the WTO members with rules 
concerning compensation. The rules apply when a member wants to initiate a trade 
destructive measure to protect its domestic industry.87    
7.3.2 Suspension of Concessions or Other Obligations
To suspend concessions or other obligations is in fact a measure contrary to the basic 
principle of trade liberalization of the WTO. The measure is applied with the intention
to damage another member’s trade interest and coerce that member into a certain way 
of action. 
7.3.2.1 Development of the Rule
The concept of retaliation in the WTO agreement has two bases: 
1. Increasing customs and quantities restrictions can be used as a trade policy 
weapon to force the opponent to decrease its customs or quantities restrictions. 
2. A member damaged because of inconsistent measures by another member has 
the right according to international law to use, under certain circumstances, 
prohibited measures against the law breaking party. 
Article XXIII of the GATT states that if the contracting parties consider the 
circumstances serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting 
party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of 
such concessions or other obligations as they determine to be appropriate under the 
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30
circumstances. The understanding from 1979 did not contain any further explanation,
and neither did the ministerial declaration from 1982. A dominant attitude among the 
members was that the possibility to retaliate was a potential threat that members did 
not need to use as recourse, and therefore the remedy did not have any visible 
function in practice.88
The concept of retaliation continued to appear indistinct. The measure was used only 
once89 during the GATT regime and an obvious lack of guidelines existed. The 
concept of retaliation was not prioritized in the Uruguay round, and the improvement 
report from 1989 did not contain any rules about retaliation. After this, the question 
was often raised when discussions concerning compensation were on the agenda. 
Many members saw retaliation as a final remedy that should only be used after 
authorization from the GATT contracting parties. Numerous of proposals were 
offered from different members, but there was still no agreement on retaliation in the 
Draft Final Act of 1990. Later two outlines were drafted, and this was the first time 
the term “cross-retaliation” was mentioned.90     
7.3.2.2 Retaliation in the DSU Today
If the parties have not agreed on satisfactory compensation within twenty days after 
the end of the reasonable period of time, the complainant can turn to the DSB and ask 
for permission to impose trade sanctions against the losing party failing to implement 
the recommendation or ruling. This remedy is called suspension of concessions or 
other obligations under the covered agreement.91 The DSU does not mention the term 
retaliation but the expression is generally used when discussing and commenting 
international trade. 
Concessions are, for example, tariff reduction commitments which WTO members 
have made in multilateral trade negotiations. The DSB must first give the complaining 
party authorization to suspend WTO obligations. The granting of the authorization 
must be done within thirty days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time. The 
approval is virtually automatic since the DSB decides on the request by 
reverse/negative consensus. When the request is approved, the winning party grants 
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the right to impose countermeasures that otherwise would be forbidden under the 
WTO agreement.92
This remedy is bilateral, meaning it takes place on a discriminatory basis only against 
the member failing to implement recommendations or rulings. It can be taken only by 
members that were complaining parties, not by third parties. Suspension of 
concessions usually takes the form of a drastic increase in the customs duties on 
selected products of export interest to the offending party. An import quota on certain 
products from the member failing with the implementation is another example of 
retaliation. Retaliation puts economic and political pressure on the offending party to 
implement the recommendations. The remedy implies the raising of trade barriers by 
the winning member vis-à-vis the losing member. Therefore, this remedy is damaging 
the free trade principles. However, it also has the effect of rebalancing mutual trade 
benefits between WTO members.93
7.3.2.2.1 Countermeasures 
The DSU explains that retaliation should be imposed in the same sector as in which 
the nullification or impairment was found94. To fulfill this purpose, the multilateral 
trade agreements are separated into three groups in harmony with the parts of Annex 1 
to the WTO agreement, namely GATT, GATS, and TRIPS. A general principle is that 
if the violation occurred in the area of services, the complainant shall first seek to 
suspend concessions in this sector. Notice that, a WTO-inconsistent tariff on 
automobiles can be responded to with a tariff surcharge on furniture since both of 
them belong to the sector of goods.95  
If the winning member finds it ineffective or impracticable to remain within the same 
sector, the countermeasures can be imposed in a different sector under the same 
agreement96. The option has no relevance concerning the area of goods. However, for 
example, when a violation occurs in the area of trademarks, countermeasures can be 
applied in the area of patent. There is also an option under the article for the 
complaining member to retaliate under another agreement. This applies if the member 
finds it impracticable or ineffective to remain within the same agreement and the 
circumstances are serious enough. The question if the circumstances are serious
enough is examined and determined by the arbitrator with the current situation within
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the disputing parties as a starting point.97 This possibility of “cross-retaliation” allows 
the sanctions to be more efficient at the same time as the hierarchy in the article 
reduces the use of actions to spill over into unconnected sectors.
The countermeasure needs to be equivalent to the level of the nullification or 
impairment98. The complainant’s response must not go beyond the level of harm 
caused by the losing party. The suspension of obligations is not retroactive. It only 
covers the period of time after the authorization was granted from the DSB not the 
whole time the inconsistent measure has been applied or the time for the ongoing
dispute.   
7.3.2.2.2 Arbitration
An arbitrator may be requested if the disputing parties do not agree on the 
complainants proposed form of retaliation. The issues concerned can be linked either 
to the subject of whether the principles governing the form of permitted suspension 
are respected or to the subject of whether the level of retaliation is equivalent to the 
level of nullification or impairment. The arbitration shall be completed within sixty
days after the expiry of the reasonable period of time. The Director-General appoints 
the arbitrator if the original panel is not available to complete the arbitration. The 
complainant is not allowed to proceed with the retaliation during the time of the 
arbitration.99
The arbitrator shall not examine the nature of the suspension of concessions or other
obligations, but the individual/group shall determine whether the level of such 
suspension is equivalent with the nullification or impairment. This means that the 
arbitrator must calculate a proximal value of trade loss due to the WTO-inconsistent 
measure. The arbitrator shall also determine if the proposal is allowed under the 
covered agreements. The decision of the arbitrator is final, meaning the parties cannot 
seek a second arbitration. The DSB will be informed promptly about the outcome and 
then grant authorization for retaliation if this is consistent with the decision of the 
arbitrator.100
8 Article 21 and Article 22 of the DSU in Practice
The earlier chapters of this thesis have examined the development of the dispute 
settlement rulings and its current formal proceedings. To gain a greater understanding 
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of the system, the following sections contain of an overview of the rules at the critical 
stage of implementation and enforcement applied in practical situations and some of 
the problems and questions that have arisen since the introduction of the DSU. As 
with all newly introduced systems, attention has been drawn to numerous different 
issues and practical outcomes. This work will present three main areas which have 
attracted the attention of different WTO actors since the dispute settlement system 
was introduced in 1995. The chapter is divided into the following three chapters:
(i) Examining the relationship between article 21.5 of the DSU and 
article 22 of the DSU,
(ii) Discussing the problems with the concept of compensation, and 
(iii) Observing retaliation as a remedy in practical life.     
8.1 The Sequencing Issue
One issue arising at the implementation stage of the DSU is the relationship between 
article 21.5 of the DSU and article 22.2 of the DSU. Question may arise whether the 
compliance proceedings or the suspension of concessions proceedings has priority, if 
either. Just reading at the articles, the procedure may look straightforward, but 
imagine the following scenario. Suppose the respondent uses the full reasonable 
period of time before announcing compliance with the recommendation. If the 
complainant believes the regime is inconsistent with WTO policy, it has the 
opportunity to refer the matter to the panel. The panel must report within ninety days 
of that request101. If the respondent is not satisfied with the panel’s ruling, another 
forty-five days could be required for the Appellate Body to consider the matter. The 
dilemma that may arise is that even if the panel or the Appellate Body finds the 
reformed policy still WTO-inconsistent, the twenty days after the reasonable period of 
time for a complainant to request authorization to retaliate will have expired. This 
interpretation of the relationship between article 21.5 and article 22 suggests there 
could be an endless loop of litigation.102
8.1.1 Comments  
8.1.1.1 Practical Life Examples
In the EC – Bananas III case, the United States stated that it had the right to request 
authorization to suspend concessions and other obligations against the European 
Communities, in spite of the European Communities’ new banana regime. The new 
regime was adopted in response to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. The 
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European Communities strongly opposed the request by the United States on the 
ground that if the request was permitted, it would amount to sanctioning a unilateral 
determination by the United States that the European Communities’ new banana 
regime was not consistent with the recommendations and rulings or not. The 
European Communities argued that the proper procedure was for the United States to 
first request an article 21.5 panel to determine whether its new banana regime was 
consistent with the recommendations and rulings. According to the European 
Communities, it was only after the ruling by the compliance review panel that the 
United States could have the option to turn to article 22.2. The parties finally managed 
to reach an agreement which allowed both requests under articles 21.5 and 22.2 of the 
DSU to go on simultaneously. 
After this case, it became customary for the parties to reach an ad hoc agreement on 
the sequencing issue. The disputing parties have agreed in some cases to initiate the 
process under both of the articles simultaneously. The retaliation procedure has then 
been suspended until the finishing point of the compliance procedure. In other cases, 
the parties have used article 21.5 of the DSU to initiate the process before using 
article 22 with the understanding that the respondent would not object to a request for 
authorization of suspension of concessions under article 22.6 of the DSU because of 
the expiry of the thirty-day deadline for the DSB to grant this authorization.103
8.1.1.2 Related Problems and Alternative Interpretation
A related problem concerns how the disputing parties are forced to act. Under article 
22.6 of the DSU, the DSB has to grant authorization to suspend concessions within 
thirty days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time. In the meantime, if a request 
under article 21.5 has been made, the compliance review would not have been
completed by then. If the complainant is forced to turn in a request for authorization 
to suspend concessions at this stage just to keep the opportunity to retaliate open, it 
may just trigger the process and make the situation more complicated. It could also 
imply that the complainant had come to the conclusion that the proposed 
implementing measures are not WTO-consistent. However, article 23 of the DSU 
states that WTO Members must have recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU 
to determine whether a measure is WTO-inconsistent. Therefore, members may not 
decide unilaterally whether a measure is WTO-inconsistent or not.
Authors have presented an alternative interpretation to the problem. One may argue 
that article 22.2 of the DSU contains the possibility that the losing party does not do 
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anything at all to bring its measures into compliance with the recommendations or 
rulings. In this case there will be a twenty-day deadline to request for 
countermeasures. Further according to this interpretation, article 21.5 of the DSU
deals with the situation where the losing party does something to bring its measures 
into compliance but the winning party does not agree with its full compliance. In this 
case the twenty-day request period should start at the end of the procedure of article 
21.5 of the DSU if the findings are against the respondent. Using this interpretation, 
there is no dilemma in law. The compliance review panel should simply decide if the 
reform is adequate or not. If not, the complaining party can request for retaliation.104  
The positive aspect of this interpretation is that it clearly follows the structure of the 
DSU, while avoiding the possibility for parties to make unilateral decisions on 
whether compliance is achieved or not. The retaliatory measures would remain in 
place until the panel or the complainant is satisfied with the new regime. The negative 
aspects are that this interpretation, just like the others, leaves the possibility open for 
the winning party to make an ongoing series of inconsistent reforms. This may make 
the process long and costly and just trigger the already damaged relationship between 
the parties.
8.1.1.3 Brief Conclusion
The issue in short: Both deadlines run from the end of the reasonable period of time. 
The DSU encourage the member to act within thirty days on the basis of an arbitration 
report that will not be concluded for sixty days to ninety days after the complaining 
member is supposed to already have acted on the result. To me, this is probably just a 
formal mistake that may arise when complex documents are drafted and redrafted by 
exhausted negotiators working under incessant pressure against the clock. This little 
glitch in the system has had practical effects and is showing a non-flattering side of 
the WTO: the comparative weakness of its legislative function as compared to its 
adjudicating function.105 Even if no member wants to keep the current sequencing 
glitch in the system, and even if concerned members have managed to agree on ad hoc 
solutions, the members collectively have still not been able to amend the DSU to 
correct the problem. Past DSU review negotiations have not found a solution to this 
issue of sequencing yet, the issue is continuing to be discussed in the current 
negotiations. I strongly agree with other authors and the number of members 
concerned by this issue that it should be formalized in one way or another. More 
predictability and certainty will be given to the system, while avoiding an arbitrary 
process.
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8.2 Compensation in Practice
From a pure economic view, compensation as it is used within the WTO today, is 
simply trade liberalization. When for example, tariffs are reduced, economic welfare 
will increase in the respondent country, in the complaining country, and even in third 
countries which export the products whose import barriers have been lowered. Third 
importing countries will lose from terms of trade deterioration, but the world as a 
whole will be better off economically according to standard gains-from-trade 
theories.106 From this point of view, compensation should be the most used remedy 
within WTO simply because trade liberalization is one of the basic ideas within the 
organization.
 
Since the introduction of the DSU in 1995, the concept of compensation has not been 
used very frequently. There are several possible reasons why compensation as a 
remedy is rarely used in practice. This chapter will examine just a few of them. First, 
compensation is voluntary, and the disputing parties have to agree on the solution. 
Second, the compensation must be consistent with the covered agreements. 
Conformity with the covered agreements implies consistency with the most-favoured-
nation principle found in article I of the GATT. Third, the current system on 
compensation may not provide for effective reparation of damages suffered by the 
complaining party. 
8.2.1 Comments
8.2.1.1 Practical Life Examples
The Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II case is an example of one of the few cases where 
the disputing parties managed to agree on compensation. The complainants claimed 
that spirits exported to Japan were discriminated against under the Japanese liquor tax 
system which, in the complainants’ view, levied a substantially lower tax on “shochu” 
than on whisky, cognac, and white spirits. In this case, the compensation took the 
form of temporary, additional market access concessions for certain products of 
export interest to the original complainants. For example, the negotiations with the 
European Communities finally ended up with an agreement on an accelerated 
reduction of the tariff rates on whisky and brandy as compensation for the delayed 
implementation by Japan. Another example of when an agreement on compensation 
was reach is the United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act case. The 
United States and the European Communities reached the temporary arrangement that 
the United States should make a lump-sum payment in the amount of 3.3 million US 
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dollars to a fund to be set up by performing rights societies in the European 
Communities for the provision of general assistance to their members and the 
promotion of authors' rights. 
8.2.1.2 The Effect of The Sequencing Issue 
The issue discussed previously concerning the relationship between articles 21.5 and 
22 of the DSU also has impact on the use of compensation as a remedy. The current 
procedure under the articles does not guarantee a timely arbitration decision on the 
extent of compensation that is warranted. Hereby, the uncertainty concerning the 
sequencing issue does not promote a frequent use of the concept of compensation.
8.2.1.3 The Voluntary and Agreeing Part 
The voluntary aspect of the remedy combined with the fact that the parties have to 
agree on, not only to compensate and to get compensated, but also on the specific 
amount thereof107, makes the concept troublesome to use. In practice this has been 
very difficult since there is no actual way to enforce the non-complying member to 
compensate. Another aspect is, since the compensation is voluntary, the respondent 
can end it at the same moment it reforms its WTO inconsistent regime, awaiting the 
outcome of any further action by the complainant under article 21.5 of the DSU. 
Hereby, the respondent would gain greater control of how the entire procedure would 
continue. Article 22 of the DSU states that if no satisfactory compensation has been 
agreed upon within twenty days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of 
time, the complainant may request for authorization to retaliate. The short time frame 
may put positive pressure on the parties to reach an agreement, but it can also be hard 
for already disputing parties to consent in less than three weeks. 
8.2.1.4 Consistency with Covered Agreements
The obligation of consistency with the most-favoured-nation principle adds another 
difficulty to the practical use of compensation. Hereby, members other than the 
complainant would also benefit if compensation is offered, for example, in the form 
of a lower tariff. In the end this would probably lead to the complainant asking for a 
larger degree of access to the market when discussing the compensation than if access 
was able to be provided only concerning the complaining party. Even though the new 
openness on the market would increase economic welfare for the respondent, the 
political economy of trade policy is such that the political leadership of the country 
would lose from such unilateral reform. Otherwise there would have been no 
incentive to create the import barriers from the first place.108 The obligation to offer 
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compensation to all WTO members will in practice result in raised prices for the
respondent and no exclusive benefit for the complainant.109 This will make the 
remedy less attractive to both of the disputing parties. 
8.2.1.5 Reparation of damages 
A breach of an international obligation under general international law leads to 
responsibility generating certain legal consequences. The obligation to come to an end 
with the illegal measure is the first consequence under international law.110 To make 
an analogy, this remedy of cessation is equivalent to article 21 of the DSU, the 
withdrawal of the inconsistent measure. Further, the injured state has the right under 
general international law to claim full reparation in the form of: 
(i) Restitution in kind; 
(ii) Compensation; 
(iii) Satisfaction; and 
(iv) Assurances and Guarantees of non-repetition. 
Restitution means that the state responsible for the wrongful act is obligated to re-
establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided 
to the extent that restitution is not materially impossible or does not involve a burden 
out of proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation111. 
The wrongdoing actor is obligated to compensate such damage that has not been 
made good for by restitution. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable 
damage including interest and, under certain circumstances, loss of profits.112 Note 
that this differs from article 22 of the DSU which does not explicitly provide for the 
compensation of damage suffered. So far, WTO remedies have concerned only 
prospective relief. Satisfaction may consist of an acknowledgement of the breach, an 
expression of regret, a formal apology, or another appropriate behaviour. Satisfaction 
shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the 
responsible state.113
Question may arise if the rules laid down in the ILC apply when there is a breach of 
WTO law or if the remedies provided for in the DSU are the only ones available. 
Most of the WTO members seem to share the view that when creating a detailed set of 
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rules aimed for handling breaches of WTO law, the DSU has contracting out of the 
general economic law on State responsibility and, therefore, also the rules concerning 
compensation.114 The interpretation seems to be correct since states may actually 
deviate from customary international rules. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties declares invalid only those treaties which contradict a peremptory norm of 
international law.115 According to the criterion set out in the ILC draft, the DSU must 
be considered lex specialis handling these kinds of questions.116 On the other hand, 
nothing under the current WTO dispute settlement system or any of the disputes 
decided up to this date explicitly precludes reparation for past damages.117 If the 
concept of compensation did provide for effective reparation of damages suffered by 
the complainant, naturally this would make compensation as a solution more 
attractive to this party.
8.2.1.6 Brief Conclusion
There have been discussions from time to time to make the compensation within the 
DSU financial. Every proposal has always been turned down.118 Reasons for the 
rejections have, for example, been difficulties concerning calculation of the damage 
suffered, the politically incorrect situation where a developing country is forced to 
pay a huge amount of money to a much richer developed country, and the difficulties 
to force a sovereign state to actually pay the compensation. To me, a financial 
solution may make the compensation as a remedy more attractive to the complainant,
but it may also uphold the inevitable difference between the country members of the 
WTO. The monetary damages a member with a strong economy have to pay to a 
weaker member or a developing country may seem trivial to the strong member, while 
the amount could be a financial catastrophe to the weaker member. A more suitable 
solution, which will be discussed more in detail later, may be a combination with the
other temporary remedy; the suspension of concessions or other obligations. 
8.3 Retaliation in Practice
The possibility to take action under article 22.2 of the DSU to suspend concessions or 
other obligations is the last option for a complaining party to put pressure on the 
losing party to implement recommendations or rulings. Since the first of January 
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1995, WTO has given authorizations of suspensions of concessions fifteen119 times,
although the members have not made use of the possibility to retaliate in all of the 
fifteen cases. The remedy is used more frequently than compensation. However, there 
are practical problems arising with this remedy as well. This chapter will discuss a 
few of them.
First, retaliation measures are trade destructive and can affect the injured party 
negatively as well as the losing party. Second, in particular the possibility to retaliate 
is not a genuine option to smaller or developing country members. Third, these 
smaller and developing country members are also the ones that are most affected by 
the possibility to “cross-retaliate”. Doubts certainly do exist if the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations is an efficient temporary remedy for breach of WTO 
law.   
8.3.1 Comments
The suspension of concessions or other obligations is very different in nature from 
compensation. The remedy is, for example, easier to use since there is no need for the 
parties to agree. As opposed to compensation, retaliation involves the raising of trade 
barriers which is damaging free trade principles and works contrary to the basic 
principles of trade liberalization within the WTO. 
8.3.1.1 Practical Life Examples
Cases where the possibility to retaliate occurred are for example the EC – Bananas III
case, where the US enlarged customs duties on certain products to 100 percent ad 
valorem on annual imports covering 191.4 million US dollars of European goods, the 
US – FSC case, where the European Communities opted for retaliation measures on 
selected products consisting of an additional custom duty of five percent increased 
each month by one percent up to a maximum of seventeen percent, and the EC-
Hormones case, where retaliation was made by the United States and Canada for an 
amount of 116.8 million US dollars and 11.3 million Canadian dollars a year 
respectively.
8.3.1.2 Negative Effects 
When the complaining party chooses to suspend concessions against the respondent’s 
exports, the complainant is usually not helped by the retaliation in practice. It is 
actually on the contrary harmed because of the standard cost of protectionist 
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barriers120. This may deter small or developing country members confronting a larger 
member from seeking a solution through the DSU. This was the case for Ecuador in 
the EC – Bananas III case, where Ecuador was authorized to apply retaliation 
measures for an amount of 201.6 million US dollars a year, but found it impossible to 
make use of this possibility without causing severe damage to its own economy. 
Another problem concerning this remedy is that retaliation actually does nothing to 
help the specific exporting industry of the complaining party that has been denied 
market access in the first place. Rather, it is the importing industries of the 
complaining party that get temporary backing through the prohibitive tariffs imposed 
by the retaliation measure. On the other hand, the respondent’s industries that are 
harmed by the retaliation are typically not the ones that have been benefiting from the 
WTO-inconsistent measure. Rather, they are the industries chosen by the complainant 
with a view to have the largest negative political impact to put pressure on the 
government of the respondent member.121
These aspects show that the remedy is targeting different domestic markets and 
individuals in a way which is difficult to motivate. This may trigger tensions not only 
within the internal market, but also between the disputing parties. One solution to the 
problem may be to introduce rules which more specifically point out the areas where
the complainant has the right to take action. The right to retaliate could be more 
closely connected to the trade damaging area and not unilaterally chosen by the 
complainant. On the other hand, it is important to not wipe out the possibility for 
small and developing country members to cross-retaliate and to use the authorization 
in an efficient way. This will be discussed more in detail later in this chapter. 
Another way to handle the problem is to supplement the retaliation with the concept 
of compensation. This would ensure that the industry or sector which in fact suffers 
the damage from the WTO inconsistent measure actually benefits from the retaliation. 
One alternative is to force the losing member to pay an amount of money equivalent 
to the damage caused as compensation instead of letting the complainant impose, for 
example, trade destructive tariffs. Pecuniary compensation would be easier to monitor 
and more accessible for weaker members. Problems may arise on how to distribute 
the compensation within the receiving country. Unless specific rules exist, principles 
of diplomatic protection indicate that it is up to the government in the receiving 
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country to decide upon distribution.122 Even cash compensation does have its 
problems. In the US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act case discussed earlier, the United 
States agreed to pay cash compensation to the European Communities. However, 
Australia argued that this form of cash compensation was discriminatory. Australia 
stated that its artists continued to sustain losses as a result of the WTO-inconsistent 
US legislation, and yet it remained uncompensated.123   
8.3.1.3 Stronger Versus Weaker Members
All of the WTO members are equal from the legal point of view of the DSU. 
However, when the remedies are applied in practice, it is of great importance which 
members are opposing each other. For members acting against similar members, 
political and economic powers as factors in achieving compliance may be 
manageable. In those cases, countermeasures may actually encourage compliance. In 
other cases where a weaker member is faced with non-compliance by a 
disproportionately stronger member, political powers may make compliance hard to 
accomplish. And even if compliance finally occurs, the sectors of the weaker member 
may already have been forced out of business. From this aspect, negotiation on 
compensation and the imposition of countermeasures are only highlighting and 
upholding the inevitable political and economic inequality between WTO members. It 
would be difficult, for example, for Chad to retaliate against United States or the 
European Community. Difficulties may arise since the retaliation of Chad may in turn 
provoke counter-retaliation in non-WTO-related fields such as development aid or 
fence off the domestic market of Chad from needed imports from the stronger 
opponent.124 This scenario would only hurt the weaker member, not induce 
compliance by the stronger opponent. This is definitely not the desirable effect 
applying article 22 of the DSU in practice. 
8.3.1.4 Cross-retaliation
To smaller and developing country members, the possibility to suspend obligations 
under a different agreement or a different sector can be very important in different 
ways.125 First, smaller and developing countries do not always import goods, services,
or intellectual property rights in adequate quantities in the same sector as those in 
which the violation or other nullification or impairment took place. This scenario 
assumes that the violation or other nullification or impairment affected exports of the 
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complainant and that the suspension of obligations would intend to damage the 
imports from the respondent, as is most commonly, but not necessarily, the case. It 
may be hard, and sometimes impossible, to suspend obligations at a level equivalent 
to that of the nullification or impairment of the respondent, unless the winning party 
can suspend obligations under a different agreement or in a different sector. 
Second, if the bilateral trade relationship is not symmetric, retaliation in the same 
sector or under the same agreement may be ineffective. Particularly if the respondent 
is a big nation, the effects of the suspension of obligations and the imposition of trade 
barriers may not even be visible in the trade statistics of the respondent. Third, as was 
the case in Ecuador discussed earlier, it may be unaffordable for a developing country 
member to impose trade barriers against imports following the suspension of 
obligations under GATT 1994 or GATS. This would reduce the supply and raise the 
price of these imports on which the consumers and producers in the complaining 
country may depend. 
These three aspects demonstrate that it is important for developing and smaller 
countries to be able to use methods of suspending obligations which do not result in 
trade barriers. The TRIPS agreement is an example on how to do so. In the EC –
Bananas III case, the arbitrators decided that Ecuador had the right to retaliate under 
TRIPS instead of under GATT and GATS where the EC banana regime actually 
existed.126 Ecuador could now allow local wine producers to sell their red wine as 
“Bordeaux”, and permit local music pirates to sell unauthorized copies of some 
European hit recordings, though only for the Ecuadorian domestic market. By
implementing intellectual property under GATT/WTO, the protection of the sector
became more efficient, but it also opened up the opportunity of powerful retaliation 
under this agreement.   
8.3.1.5 The Bilateral Form
Looking at the bilateral form of this enforcement remedy, a risk of inefficiency may 
occur. Imagine the following scenario127: Two WTO members are involved in two 
separate trade disputes between each other. Each of them is a complainant in one case 
and a respondent in the other. Both of the cases are won by the complainant, meaning 
each of the members is a winner in one case each. Both of the members refuse to 
comply with the recommendation or ruling, and both attain authorization to retaliate 
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against the other. The WTO-inconsistent measures have equal negative trade effect. 
Can in this situation, one measure be compensated by the other, and as a result can 
both members agree to continue their mutually inconsistent relationship? Under the 
current system, this is a possibility for the disputing parties. However, from the 
perspective of the rest of the WTO members, this solution will not be in
correspondence with the principle of compliance with WTO rules as a collective 
good.   
8.3.1.6 Collective Actions
Another problem under the current rules is that only the complaining party may
impose countermeasures. That particular member may to bear both the cost of the 
legal procedure, and the cost of the inefficient countermeasures which have been 
discussed earlier. A move towards a more collective action under DSU, which already 
exist within the concept of compensation, would make the costs multilateral. It would
also be the organization, not a single member, which attempts to enforce WTO 
rules.128 This would give more strength to the remedy at this critical stage of the 
dispute and encourage smaller and developing country members to use the procedure 
in a larger extent. When discussing a more collective procedure, the risk of creating 
the ground for a trade war must be noticed. Members may bargain with each other and 
create unwanted coalitions and bilateral agreements on how to act in potential 
disputes. This could be harmful to the basic principle of trade liberalization and the 
foundation of the organization.
8.3.1.7 Brief Conclusion  
This remedy is trade destructive, and it may not help the winning party the needed
way. It is especially hard for a small or developing member to confront a stronger 
party since the use of the possibility to retaliate may cause severe damage to its own 
economy. To me, the main problem with this remedy is the political and economic 
inequality between the members of the WTO. A weak member with a small domestic 
market may not have any possibility to use or benefit from this remedy at all. This 
may deter these member countries from referring to the dispute settlement system in 
the first place. On the other hand, if two equal parties are opposing each other, this 
may be a perfectly functioning method to put a powerful pressure on the opponent to 
implement the recommendation or ruling. The discussion shows that the remedy is not 
efficient for every party in every single dispute and may therefore uphold the 
inequality between the members of the WTO.  
  
128 Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules – Toward a More 
Collective Approach, pp 344-345.
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9 DSU Review and Negotiations
Even if the WTO dispute settlement system has been a success in many ways, it was 
determined by the time of the introduction of the DSU that the system was to be 
examined and evaluated after using it for a couple of years. 
9.1 Background
A ministerial decision129 made in 1994 stated that the dispute settlement rules should 
be reviewed by first of January 1999. The review started in the DSB in 1997, but no 
agreement was reached. The members expressed that the system was working 
satisfactorily while, at the same time, a large number of proposals for improvements 
were made. The discussions continued on an informal basis, and ended up in a 
proposal for reform to the Seattle Session.130 An agreement on the proposal was 
probably not far away, but fell victim to the overall failure of the session. 
In 2000 and 2001, informal discussions outside the DSB concerning amendments to 
the DSU continued. These efforts resulted in a revised proposal131 by fourteen WTO 
members chaired by Japan. Neither the United States nor the European Communities 
were involved. The sequencing issue was one of the topics addressed, however, the 
members failed, once again, to agree on the proposal. At The Doha Ministerial 
Conference in November 2001, member governments formally agreed to negotiate to 
improve and clarify the DSU132. These negotiations are still active today and take 
place in special sessions of the DSB. The members were encouraged to contribute 
with questions, proposals, and comments concerning changes and improvements of 
the DSU to these special sessions. The problems described earlier in this thesis are 
just a few of the discussion points brought to the attention of the special sessions. 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration clearly states that the DSU negotiations shall not 
be tied to the overall success or failure of the other areas negotiated under the round. 
As the development and improvement of the dispute settlement system are in the 
interest of all members, it is inappropriate to turn the DSU into a bargaining tool in 
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the overall negotiations. This separation was reflected in the timeframe for the DSU 
negotiation which differentiates itself from the overall round. First it was scheduled to 
be concluded in 2003, and later in 2005. At The Ministerial Conference in Hong 
Kong, the ministers instructed the bodies, which have been reviewing the proposals,
to complete the consideration of these proposals, and report periodically to the 
General Council. The Conference asked that clear recommendations for a decision 
were made no later than December 2006.133
9.2 Proposals for Clarifications and Amendments
Up until the first deadline of the negotiations in 2003, the special session of the DSB 
met several times every year, both formally and informally. A total of forty-two
proposals for clarifications and amendments to the DSU were submitted at this 
time134. The proposals concerned many of the DSU rules and were submitted by both 
developed and developing country members. Ambassador Péter Balás, Chairman of 
the Special Session of the DSU at this point, drafted legal texts that ended up in the 
so-called Chairman’s text135. 
The Chairman’s text contains of a significant number of reform proposals including
the sequencing issue, the enhancement of compensation as a temporary remedy for 
breach of WTO law, and other problems concerning the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations. Proposals not supported by a satisfactorily number of members 
were not included in the text. An example of a rejected proposal was one concerning 
collective and monetary retaliation. However, once again the members were unable to 
agree on the drafted text. Members had different opinions on whether the continuing 
negotiations should concern only the Chairman’s Text or other proposals as well, and 
the deadlines got displaced time after time.  
9.2.1 Proposals Concerning Article 21.5 and Article 22 of the DSU
This section will examine the current status of the proposals concerning the practical 
problems observed and discussed earlier.136
  
133 Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee: TN/DS/18. 1 September 2006. 
134 Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/DS/9, dated 6 June 2003, paragraph 3. 
135 The Chairman’s Text can be found in Job(03)/91. The amended version can be found in the annex to 
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/DS/9, dated 6 June 2003.  
136 A summarizing list of the different proposals updated 21 august 2006 through document 
TN/DS/W88 can be found on the website:  
www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/research/projects/dsureview/synopsis.html, visited on 11 April 2007.
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9.2.1.1 The Sequencing Issue   
Canada made a straightforward proposal simply saying that the procedures in article 
21.5 of the DSU shall be completed before the procedures in article 22 of the DSU are 
initiated.137 The European Communities and Japan presented two similar suggestions 
proposing the inclusion of an article 21 bis on Determination of Compliance.138
According to the proposals, article 21 bis will state that disputes on adequate 
implementation measures will be heard by a compliance panel consisting of members 
from the original panel. The two members also proposed that article 22 of the DSU
should be amended, saying that the complainant may only request authorization to 
retaliate after the compliance panel or the Appellate Body finds the measure still 
inconsistent with the WTO agreement. The proposals are suggesting a more detailed 
and clear procedure, and they have both been incorporated in the Chairman’s Text. If 
adopted, this will solve the sequencing issue in an unambiguous and unmistakable 
way.   
9.2.1.2 Compensation and Retaliation
There is no unified opinion among the WTO members on how to amend or clarify 
article 22 of the DSU. As been discussed earlier, the two temporary remedies 
available today have influenced the disputing parties in different ways depending on,
for example, circumstances within the member state or on the relationship between 
the parties. The Chairman’s text provide for a new writing. The text in short states 
that the complaining party may either request the member concerned to enter into 
consultations with a view to agree on a mutually acceptable trade or other 
compensation or request an authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to 
the member concerned of concessions or other obligations. The text also clarifies
where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered 
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendation and rulings, 
proceedings shall be undertaken under article 21 bis before recourse to this paragraph.  
To me, the article in the text came out a bit blurry. I get the feeling it is not actually
dealing with the practical problems concerning the two temporary remedies presented 
earlier. The members were not completely satisfied either, and since many of the 
proposals were left outside the text, the discussions still continue on the area. Even if 
a great number of proposals were presented by the members, this thesis will only 
show an example of some of the more controversial suggestions which never got 
retained in the Chairman’s text. 
  
137 Communication from Canada TN/DS/W/49, dated on 14 February 2003.
138 Communication from Japan, TN/DS/W/22, dated on 28 October 2002, and Communication from the 
European Communities, TN/DS/W/38, dated on 23 January 2003.
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Mexico made a proposal139 to allow members to transfer, in reality to sell, its right to 
retaliate to another member. This would give the possibly weaker winning party a 
quicker and maybe more suitable compensation. The possibly stronger “buyer” may 
have a better ability to make use of the possibility to retaliate. Cuba, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe wanted to 
strengthen the possibility to cross-retaliate.140 The group proposed that in a dispute in 
which the complaining party is a developing country member and the losing party is a 
developed country member; the complainant shall have the right to seek authorization 
for suspension of concessions or other obligations with respect to any or all sectors 
under any covered agreement.  
The Least Developed Countries (LDC) made a proposal141 saying that WTO members 
should clarify the provision to the effect that compensation should take the form of 
enhanced market access if this will prejudice other members, and that monetary 
compensation is to be preferred. Such monetary compensation should be equal to the 
loss or injury suffered, and directly arising from the offending measure. The 
quantification of loss or injury to be compensated should always commence from the 
date the member in breach adopted the offending measure. Ecuador presented a 
solution142 where compensation may be entirely or partly monetary.
The LDC Group stated143 that the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism and the 
potential negative impact of retaliatory measures for poor economies are well 
documented. The LDCs presented that one solution to this handicap is to adopt a 
"principle of collective responsibility" akin to its equivalent under the United Nations 
Charter. Under this principle, all WTO Members would collectively have the right 
and responsibility to enforce the recommendations or rulings of the DSB. In the case 
where a developing or least-developed country member has been a successful 
complainant, collective retaliation should be available automatically as a matter of 
special and differential treatment. In determining whether to authorize collective 
retaliation or not, the DSB should not be constrained by quantification on the basis of 
the rule on nullification and impairment.
  
139 Communication from Mexico, TN/DS/W/40, dated on 21 January 2003.
140 Communication from Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania 
and Zimbabwe, TN/DS/W/19, dated on 20 September 2002. 
141 Communication from Least Developed Countries, TN/DS/W/17, dated on 19 September 2002.
142 Communication from Ecuador, TN/DS/W/33, dated on 17 January 2003.
143 Communication from Least Developed Countries, TN/DS/W/17, dated on 19 September 2002.
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Kenya made a proposal144 describing the principles and procedures applying to 
requests for collective suspension of concessions. Special rules in the proposal
concentrated on developing and least-developed countries. The rules stated that where 
the DSB grants authorisation to members to suspend concessions or other obligations, 
the level of suspension for each Member authorized shall be such as to secure full 
compensation for the injury to the developing or least-developed country member, the 
protection of its development interests, and the timely and effective implementation of 
the recommendations and rulings.    
The African group proposed145 that compensation should prominently reflect the need 
for monetary compensation and to be continually paid pending and until the 
withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO obligations. Such monetary 
compensation would address the loss suffered as a result of, and for the duration of, 
the measures in breach of WTO obligations, but without being a substitute for the 
withdrawal of those measures. The requirement in which the measures in breach 
should be withdrawn should not be affected by any provision for mandatory,
monetary compensation. The group also communicated a solution for collective 
retaliation. There should be a provision stating that in the resorting to the suspension 
of concessions, all WTO members shall be authorised to collectively suspend 
concessions to a developed member which adopts measures in breach of WTO 
obligations against a developing member, notwithstanding the requirement that 
suspension of concessions is to be based on the equivalent level of nullification and 
impairment of benefits.
9.3 Brief Conclusion
While examining the proposals propounded, a trend is noticeable. The WTO members 
seem to be nearly unified in resolving the sequencing issue, and the problem will be
solved if the Chairman’s text on this area is accepted. Looking at the proposals 
concerning article 22 of the DSU, diversity between two groups of country members 
may be observed. Weaker members, developing country members, and the least 
developed countries are focusing on monetary compensation and collective retaliation 
as a practical solution. The group of developed countries is not following this way of 
thinking and does not focus at all on this kind of solutions. This aspect makes it, 
evidently, difficult to agree on an amendment or re-writing which will satisfy all the 
WTO members. 
  
144 Communication from Kenya, TN/DS/W/42, dated on 16 January 2003.
145 Communication from the African Group, TN/DS/W/15, dated on 9 September 2002. 
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Unfortunately, it is nearly factual that negotiations within the WTO seldom reach a 
conclusion within the time period assigned. This is true even in the case concerning 
the DSU review. To date, May 2007, there is still no official recommendation for a 
decision on how to improve the DSU circulated.146 Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto, 
present (May 2007) Chairman of the Special Session of the DSU, stated147 that the 
work of the DSB Special Session has continued to be based primarily on efforts by
the members to work among themselves, with a view to present improved draft legal 
text to the Special Session, building on previous work. To me, it seems like the review 
of the DSU has been set aside while awaiting the negotiations in other important 
WTO areas. We may see the DSU as part of the overall “give and take” in the end 
anyway, even if this was not a desirable outcome in the beginning of the negotiations.     
10 Discussion: The future of the DSU
10.1 Complaint Statistics
It is not possible to with explicit sureness determine the future volume of cases 
brought to the WTO. It is, however, possible to see a trend during the past twelve
years (1995 through 2006, inclusive). According to this trend, the case load will be 
low. During this time period, 356148 consultation questions have been made. This 
shows an average of slightly less than thirty cases per year. However, last year there 
were only fifteen requests compared to twelve in 2005, nineteen in 2004 and twenty-
six in the year of 2003. The greatest number of consultations occurred in 1997 when 
fifty requests were made.149 One can only speculate why the trend has been downward 
since 1997. Certainly there were disputes in the pipeline in the beginning awaiting the 
introduction of the new system. Obviously this was the case for Singapore150 who 
filed the first request for consultation on the tenth of January, 1995 almost 
immediately after the system was introduced. Naturally, this accumulation no longer 
exist, or is at least not as great anymore, and does therefore not contribute to the 
current and future number of requests. 
One possible way to interpret this statistic is that members are now complying with 
WTO obligations when applying new measures. It is impossible to document how 
many measures were not adopted because of WTO obligations, but it is probably not 
  
146 Telephone interview with Elin Hjulström, Swedish National Board of Trade, 9 March 2007. 
147 Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee: TN/DS/19. 4 May 2007.
148 Update of all WTO Dispute Settlement cases: Report WT/DS/OV/29, 9 January 2007. 
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unreasonable to assume that the obligation to comply has been a factor. On the other 
hand, a real life episode shows that policy makers are not always influenced by WTO 
obligations. Running up for election in the United States in 2002, control of the 
Senate was one of the questions in the pipeline. Both parties made WTO inconsistent 
promises to the agricultural interest in key states which resulted in the 2002 Farm 
Bill. Later in the United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton case151, both the panel 
and the Appellate Body found the bill to be in serious non-conformity with WTO 
requirements.152 This way of acting, to solve the political problem now and worry 
about the WTO later, will probably always contribute to the case load. One can only 
hypothetically speculate about the future. The development is much depending on the 
outcome of the Doha Round. It is possible that new commitments will create a 
backlog in the form of existing measures that may be inconsistent with obligations 
contracted in the round.  
10.1.1 Burdening the System
There is a danger in members overburden, and therefore undermine, the dispute 
settlement system. This may be the outcome of the inability of the members to agree 
on rules concerning politically sensitive areas within international trade. Since its 
introduction, the WTO dispute settlement system has been tested when it comes to 
public health (EC – Hormones and EC – Asbestos), environmental protection (US –
Shrimp), taxation (US – FSC), and foreign and development policy (EC – Bananas 
III). 
Even if the system has been a grand success, the duty to settle disputes becomes 
harder and more laborious as the WTO is drawn deeper into politically controversial 
areas. One may see the dispute settlement system as “substantively and politically 
unsustainable”153, as the members may only obey its rulings if its powers are curbed. 
Another danger is to rely too much on the system instead of finding political 
solutions. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, a former Chairman of the Appellate Body, noted 
that the system is threatened by a dangerous imbalance between the WTO’s efficient 
judicial arm and its far less effective political arm.154 The members of the WTO must
improve the ability of the political institutions to handle the sensitive issues 
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confronting the multilateral trading system, instead of burdening the dispute 
settlement system.                   
10.2 Sovereign Member States: The Bilateral Form
Speculations concerning the WTO dispute settlement system being the future most 
efficient instrument to remove trade barriers are hard questions without simple
answers. Generally within international law, the answers depend on the expectations 
of the system. If the basis for the system is sovereign and independent member states, 
one may applaud the WTO dispute settlement system for its grand success and efforts. 
If the basis for the system is one hundred percent implementation and compliance, 
one may be amazed looking at all the times the WTO members are breaking the rules. 
Compared to the European Union, the dispute settlement system within WTO lacks 
the principle of direct effect, and the use of a prosecutor bringing action against a 
member. Within the WTO, the member governments bring action against each other,
and there is no option for an individual actor to refer a WTO inconsistent measure to 
any national or international court. Looking into statistic, the rules within the 
European Union are conformed to in a much larger extent.155
From a diplomatic point of view, a political barrier exists when a sovereign state is 
about to bring action against another sovereign state.156 This bilateral basis of the 
WTO dispute settlement system may cause difficulties in practice, even in the future. 
There is a risk that the complainant will be treated defectively by the respondent as 
revenge for its action, or the respondent may bring counter-action against the 
complainant in another trade area. There is probably always at least one area within a 
member state which is applying WTO inconsistent measures. The majority of the 
states use some kind of trade barriers to protect its domestic market, and a complaint 
may draw unwanted attention to its own inconsistent measures.
Another political barrier to compliance may be the opinion of the voting inhabitants 
of a member state. A WTO inconsistent measure is usually implemented as a result of 
pressure from the domestic market and its inhabitants.157 A democratic government is 
therefore, when forming its political agenda, divided by the will of its voters and the 
obligation to comply with an international agreement. All of these reasons will affect 
the willingness to use the dispute settlement system against another member state
even in the future, and many prohibited trade barriers will probably never be brought 
to the attention of the DSB.  
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10.3 Sovereign Member States: The Safety Valve 
Taking the earlier discussion in this thesis into consideration, the DSU and the
remedies available may not be used in an expected way today. On the other hand,
maybe the remedies are used exactly in the expected way, and the upcoming decision 
on reviewing the DSU may not change the rules very much in the end. Because of the 
grand success of the system, the rulings will probably remain basically the same158. 
Article 21 of the DSU will most likely be re-written, and this will solve the 
sequencing issue. Article 21.5 of the DSU will probably take priority over article 22 
of the DSU in the future. Problems are more likely to appear concerning article 22 of 
the DSU. It will be a difficult task to unify the members and redefine the article to 
achieve a stricter and more obligatory use of the remedies since this may not be the 
desirable outcome in the end. Hence, just like its predecessor, GATT, the WTO is 
more a balance of negotiated concessions, not primarily a set of legal rules. Therefore, 
actions taken under the DSU are not as much targeting the breach of obligations but 
the upsetting of the negotiated balance of benefits among the members. 
When examining, and sometimes criticising, the dispute settlement system and the 
remedies available, one have to remember that the system once was created to bring 
non-complying members into compliance, not to make commercial or damaged 
interests whole. Criticisms tend to compare the international legal system of WTO 
dispute settlement with any ordinary national legal system. Examining the dispute 
settlement within WTO, one can not overlook the fact that WTO applies to 
governments. These governments are both establishing and controlling the activities 
of the system. Robert Hudec once said that governments are not simply litigants, they 
are complex institutions known the world over for their inability to behave like 
rational beings.159 To me, this sentence captures the difficulties at the stage of 
implementation within the WTO dispute settlement system, and it also explains why 
the rules look like they do today.  
The remedies available today may not always result in the most efficient solution. 
However, it is important to remember that the remedies existing today are the 
remedies which the member states found they were willing to accept both as 
successful complainants and as unsuccessful defendants. A voluntary system like the 
WTO will simply never be more than its members want it to be. The fact that 
developing countries and weaker members are having a hard time taking advantage of 
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some of the benefits of the system is not the reality only within WTO law; this applies 
to almost all international law generally.160
It is noteworthy that approximately 150 governments agreed to subject themselves to 
a compulsory jurisdiction of tribunals whose decisions are legally binding. The 
reasons for doing this are many. Among them are probably motives like confidence in
the system and the competence of those who administer it, the limited subject matter 
jurisdiction, namely commerce and trade, and remedies that have been justified as a 
way of rebalancing concessions and agreed obligations. The WTO is sometimes said 
to be undemocratic and a threat to national sovereignty.161 Negotiations are held 
behind closed doors where no private actors have the right to participate. The 
influence over the organization is in practice determined by active participation 
among the members which may seem unfair to small and developing country 
members and private actors. This criticism also concern the dispute settlement system. 
The DSU was a key reform in WTO dispute settlement. It made all legal claims 
subject to compulsory adjudication by a third party, set deadlines for the process, 
made legal rulings automatically binding, made trade retaliation available in cases of 
non-compliance, and created an Appellate Body to make sure that the legal rulings by 
the first level panels were legal correct.162
One important aspect in this discussion is if it is, from a democratic point of view, 
correct that a small group like the Appellate Body, consisting of seven persons, 
should have the authority to determine the outcome in sensitive political questions in 
an area of great global importance. My conclusion is that I see the current ruling in 
article 22 of the DSU as the central rule which legalizes the dispute settlement system
in relation to national sovereignty. The current ruling also makes the system work in 
the end. The WTO as an organization is based on a voluntary thought with sovereign 
governments as creators and members. The WTO dispute settlement system presumes 
that the members voluntarily implement the recommendations and rulings; 
compensation and retaliation are just measures which may pressure the respondent to 
full compliance. There are simply no jailhouses, police men, or prosecutors available, 
only the will of the members involved in the system. 
From a democratic, diplomatic, and political point of view, an emergency exit like 
article 22 of the DSU is necessary for the practical function of the WTO dispute 
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settlement system. The members were not ready by the time of the creation of the 
system, and they may never get ready to leave the total power over global trade to the 
panels and the Appellate Body. The article keeps the door open for sovereignty, and 
is, therefore, legalizing and upholding a successful system.   
11 Concluding Comments
11.1 Weaker and Developing Country Members
While writing this thesis, the relationship under the DSU between stronger and 
weaker members especially caught my attention. It is generally agreed that the mere 
existence of a compulsory multilateral settlement system is itself a particular benefit 
for weaker members and developing countries. A system to which all members have 
access and in which decisions are made on the source of interpretation of rules instead 
of on the basis of economic power empowers weak economies and developing 
countries. In short: A system like this puts David and Goliath on the same level. From 
this point of view, a weak party will always benefit more than a strong member from 
any judicial system, since a strong member would always have other means to defend 
and impose its interests in the absence of a law enforcement system. Such a view have 
been criticized by some as being to formal and theoretical.163
In one’s defense it must be noticed that, in practice, the WTO dispute settlement 
system has, since its introduction, offered many examples where developing countries 
have prevailed over large and strong nations. On the other hand, it is important to 
remember that a system does not always work as well in practice as in theory. It is 
obvious that a developing member wanting to utilize the WTO dispute settlement 
system is faced with considerable burdens, this thesis is just pointing out few of the 
observations made during the years of the existence of the DSU. 
One important challenge for developing countries, especially to the smaller ones, is 
that the country often does not have a sufficient number of specialized human 
resources who are experts in the details of the essence of WTO law or in the dispute 
settlement proceedings. The panels and the Appellate Body are creating a growing 
body of jurisprudence, which makes it difficult for trade officials all over the world to 
handle both the essence and the procedural aspects of WTO law and the latest 
developments in different areas. It is almost impossible for a small trade delegation to 
assign one of its few trade officials to a dispute, and at the same time keep record of 
the whole breadth of WTO matters. One single dispute could force a delegation to 
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spare an official for up to two years. The Advisory Centre on WTO Law created in 
2001 is giving legal training and advice to developing countries. These countries are 
now more actively using the dispute settlement system than during the 1990s.164
As has been pointed out earlier in this thesis, it may also be challenging for a small 
member to undergo the economic harm from another member’s trade measure for the 
entire period of the dispute settlement procedure. Even if the measure is found to be 
inconsistent with WTO rules, the withdrawal may not occur until two or three years 
after filing the complaint. Even though these difficulties may occur, developing 
countries have been quite active within the system. However, the truth is that in the 
majority of the WTO disputes so far, both the complainant and the respondent have
been a developed country.165
The fact that the majority of the members of the WTO are developing countries could 
lead to the conclusion that developed countries use the dispute settlement system in a 
disproportionate way. Although, this conclusion leaves out the fact that developed 
countries account for most of the world-wide trade. These countries often have trade 
relationships in all sectors of goods and services to a large volume of trade in quantity 
and value. Naturally the risk for frictions and disputes concerning these members will 
increase. The trade volume in question may not always justify the substantial
investment of time and money necessary for the dispute for any party concerned by 
the procedure.   
11.2 The Future
What shall the future WTO dispute settlement system, and especially the remedies 
available in case of non-compliance, look like then? I think it almost impossible to 
give a straight answer to this question at this very moment. I am not even sure 
anything at all should be done in the area. It is not a matter of course that there is a 
need for, or even a possibility to, change the current rulings, at least not when 
discussing article 22 of the DSU. As discussed previously in this thesis, article 22 may 
work as an emergency exit for the members of the organization. This is how far the 
members were willing to go when creating the system, and I strongly believe that a 
change or an amendment not accepted by the majority of the members could bring 
severe damage to the very foundation of the dispute settlement system. On the other 
hand, obviously there is a need for reviewing and discussing the system, as already 
has been done for many years. The members are contributing with a great number of 
  
164 Kommerskollegium, Handelspolitisk lägesrapport 2006, pp 7-14. 
165 Update of all WTO Dispute Settlement cases: Report WT/DS/OV/29, 9 January 2007.
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opinions and proposals, which definitely shows that the users of the system call for 
some kind of development. 
One must also have in mind two additional difficulties in the process. First, the 
proceedings in the Doha round must be noticed. It has been said that it is not desirable 
that the negotiations on the dispute settlement system are part of the overall “give and
take” in the round. I agree with this point of view, but I also find it difficult to reach a 
satisfactorily result in the DSU negotiations if the overall session in the round is not 
succeeding in the end. The DSU review has almost been put on hold while awaiting 
the outcome in other areas in the round, which creates a risk for a total failure or at 
least, as it looks today, an endless delay. In one’s defence, a remarkable observation is 
that even if the Doha round was suspended in 2006, fifteen consultation questions
were made this year. This leads to the conclusion that even if the overall negotiations 
in the round are standing still, the dispute settlement system continues to function in 
practice, showing important strength and confidence in the system.     
A second difficulty to bear in mind is the inherent inequality between the members
which is reflected even in the negotiations. I have pointed out this opinion several 
times in this thesis, but I think it is worth mentioning again. There is an obvious 
inequality between, for example, the European Communities and Burkina Faso. One 
is strong and big; the other is weak and small. Members like these two turn to the 
dispute settlement system for different reasons and with different expectations. 
Naturally, they also have different proposals on how to improve the system, which
makes it hard to find a solution satisfying to every single member of the organization.
11.3 Is Financial Compensation the Solution?
The current system of WTO remedies provides the members with a choice between 
trade compensation and retaliation. It has been presented in this thesis that these 
remedies do not always meet the expectations of the organization and its members. 
The member violating WTO law will not always remove the violation, compensation 
is rarely agreed on, and retaliation works contrary to the trade liberalization goal of 
the WTO and hardly benefits either party. Another problem is that the current system 
does not provide for effective reparation of damages suffered by the members and 
private actors concerned. 
These problems are more urgent for small and weaker trade nations and developing 
country members since their economics often are small and unable to stand up against 
the stronger law-breaking opponent. The negative effects of such countermeasures on 
their domestic market may be disastrous. From my point of view, financial 
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compensation could be considered as an alternative remedy for those smaller and 
weaker WTO members for whom neither retaliation nor the present concept of 
compensation are practical alternatives. Authors166 have frequently been discussing
the subject and the developing countries167 are proposing it as a solution in the current 
negotiations. 
I would like to pay attention to the United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act case presented earlier while analyzing this alternative. Even if confusion does 
exist, the case shows that financial compensation under the WTO is in fact possible. 
For clarification, one could amend the DSU to ensure that financial compensation is a 
recognized remedy available under all the covered agreements. The US Copyright 
case also shows how and by whom the financial compensation may be calculated. An 
arbitration proceeding was set up to determine the level of nullification and 
impairment suffered by the European Communities as a result of the inconsistent 
legislation implemented by the United States. The same figure was used as the 
amount to be paid by the United States. 
In the future, the financial compensation could be calculated based on the amount of 
lost profits as well as lost trade starting from the beginning of the violation. One 
prerequisite for a successful system is that the amount of the compensation is strict
enough to make the violating member comply with recommendation and rulings of 
the DSB rather than pay the large amount of money and go on with the violation. The 
compensation may, for example, be increasing until the inconsistent measure is 
removed. Monetary compensation is by its nature more likely to induce better 
compliance.168
In the beginning, only LDCs or poor developing countries may have recourse to the 
financial compensation. These weak trade nations should only be able to request the 
compensation against the developed countries. Using this solution, the politically 
incorrect situation where a developing country is forced to pay a huge amount of 
money to a much richer member will never occur. Another benefit is that, unlike the 
current remedies, financial compensation does not create a wrong allocation of burden 
and benefits. The money could, if it is good used by the winning government, be used 
  
166 See for example Eleso, WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: Monetary Compensation as an 
Alternative for Developing Countries and Bronckers and van den Broek, Financial Compensation in 
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167 See chapter 9 of this thesis.
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to ameliorate the losses suffered by a particular sector and the member using the 
remedy will not risk harming its own domestic market by using countermeasures.
I think it is important for all the WTO members to retain the right to choose between 
the traditional remedies and the new concept of financial compensation. Hence, when 
a member thinks retaliation would be more effective, for example when the dispute 
concerns a sensitive area or when trade compensation may actually provide an 
efficient remedy, the member may still choose to prefer this option. My conclusion is 
that financial compensation is probably best introduced as an option to be added to the 
current remedies available. The analysis of the proposals communicated in the current 
negotiations shows little support for mandatory or exclusive monetary compensation 
among the developed countries. This is a fact that cannot be neglected since the 
overall success in the Doha round, and therefore probably including the DSU review, 
much depends on strong trade nations like the United States or the European 
Communities.
11.4 Final Thoughts  
As mentioned earlier, 356169 consultation questions have been made since the
introduction of the dispute settlement system in 1995. It is important to remember that 
the great majority of the cases are settled through consultations or mutually agreed 
solutions, never reaching the full DSU process and the problems with the remedies 
described in this thesis. The WTO system is the only bilateral dispute settlement 
system functioning today, and it is very advanced compared to other international 
dispute settlement system170. The system is often one of the main reasons for 
countries to become members of the WTO, knowing that a well functioning dispute 
settlement system is an opportunity even for small and weaker countries to make their 
voices heard. A well functioning system also encourages the members to bring 
additional areas under the mandate of the WTO, relying on the fact that a satisfactory
dispute settlement system exists in case of future conflicts.
However, the discussion in this thesis shows that the dispute settlement system may 
not be as successful in practice as it is in theory, especially when it comes to the 
remedies available. It seems that the new rules, in some areas, were not paired with a 
strong enough enforcement mechanism. Many of the disputes brought to the WTO 
have been almost impossible to solve when it comes to non-compliance. This problem 
often occurs when the dispute concerns politically sensitive areas with many 
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interested parties, like the EC – Bananas III case which has been going on for years. 
In practice, the legalization of disputes within WTO generally stops where 
noncompliance starts.
Finishing this thesis, I started to doubt on the efficient effect in practice of the current 
remedies available for a breach of WTO law. Examining all the problems discussed 
earlier, a serious doubtfulness with the enforcement system was observed. Over the 
years, authors have frequently been questioning the question if the status of WTO law 
gives the members the option to choose to compensate in one way or another, or to 
obey recommendations or rulings171. Even if the DSU leaves no doubt that 
compensation and suspension of concessions are temporary remedies and not 
alternatives to the final implementation, this is not always accomplished in practice. 
According to the rules, members are not supposed to choose to apply these remedies 
instead of complying with the recommendation or rulings. It is obvious that unless a 
member loses more by keeping its inconsistent measure intact than following the 
recommendation or ruling, there is no incentive for the member in question to 
comply. Instead of looking at the nullification or impairment, the level of 
compensation and retaliation could be focusing on the profit made by the wrongful 
act. 
Pascal Lamy, once the European Communities’ Commissioner responsible for 
international trade and today the Director General of the WTO, perfectly captured this 
problem by saying: “As long as you pay the penalties, you can go on as you are.”172
This sentence shows that the current remedies sometimes are inefficient, and they do 
not always guarantee a satisfactory solution between the disputing parties. A strong 
member, like the United States or the European Communities, can always pay or 
bargain its way out of the dispute, forever avoiding full compliance with the 
recommendation or rulings. Being better off breaking the rules instead of acting in 
accordance with them is not the desirable outcome of any legal system.
Certainly, stronger sanctions can promote compliance. On the other hand, the 
importance of sanctions in inducing compliance is to me probably overstated in any 
legal system, and particularly in the context of the legal system for dispute settlement 
in a voluntary organization like the WTO. One of the main reasons, as far as I can see, 
is the fact that governments are simply not individuals. Even in a democratic state, the 
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inhabitants are not always pleased with the laws, feeling that they have little or no 
stake at all in the legal system. The majority of the inhabitants obey the rules to a 
large extent, even if they strongly disagree, out of fear of sanctions. 
Governments are not individuals, and the members avoid complying with WTO rules 
by avoiding compliance or withdrawing their membership. The governments join the 
organization voluntarily and may also depart at any time. At least this is true 
concerning strong trade nations like the United States or the European Communities 
which do not suffer as much as a smaller trade nation from the remedies or the loss of 
trade partners. The problem is that this action will threaten the organization as a 
whole. The members cannot simultaneously have the system and attain its benefits,
while disobeying and undermining it. Even developed country members do have a 
strong interest in preserving the WTO system, and this is an incentive to limit the use 
of the informal flexibility that the system offers these stronger trade members.  
The important lesson to learn is that a dispute settlement system within a voluntary 
organization like the WTO can never be more than its members want it to be.
Therefore, any potential future changes of the DSU must fall within the interest of the 
majority of the members and stay on a level which a member can accept both as a 
successful winner and as an unsuccessful loser.     
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12 Annexes
12.1 Annex 1: Timeframe – settling a dispute173
How long to settle a dispute? 
These approximate periods for each stage of a dispute settlement procedure are target 
figures — the agreement is flexible. In addition, the countries can settle their dispute 
themselves at any stage. Totals are also approximate.
60 days Consultations, mediation, etc
45 days Panel set up and panellists appointed
6 months Final panel report to parties
3 weeks Final panel report to WTO members
60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report (if no appeal)
Total = 1 year (without appeal)
60-90 days Appeals report
30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts appeals report
Total = 1y 3m (with appeal)
  
173 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, visited on 24 February 2007
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12.2 Annex 2: The Panel Process174
  
174 See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm, visited on 24 February 2007
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